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Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and Burdens
William McGeveran †
Some weeks later, reviewing my notes from the 2010 Trademark Scholars’ Roundtable
(and Rebecca Tushnet’s invaluable contemporaneous blogging1), I am struck again by the
rich and engaging discussion over a wide range of issues. I am also struck by the way we
repeatedly circled, but in my opinion never quite pinned down, the related structural mechaQLVPVRISUHVXPSWLRQVGHIHQVHVDQGEXUGHQV:LWKDOOWKHELJLGHDVÁ\LQJDURXQGWKHURRP
there were times when many of us (myself included) talked past one another on these more
mundane details of civil procedure—perhaps an inevitable outcome when 20 law professors
gather around a table. But as Bob Bone emphasized in his prepared comments, the distribution of burdens and the mechanics of rules, while they come after the major normative decisions, embody those decisions and will determine whether the resulting reform functions as
intended. In this very short comment I hope to build on our discussion to clarify the meaning
and import of these three concepts, and show how they relate to the range of proposals we
considered.
Late in the Roundtable, Eric Goldman aptly summarized one persistent strand of the discussion. He suggested that many of us want to build a “fast lane” for resolution of certain types of
trademark cases, akin to the express line at the grocery store for customers with ten or fewer
items. Like several of us, he pointed to 47 U.S.C. § 230 (exempting internet intermediaries
from most liability arising from user-generated content) as an existing legal model of a reasonably effective fast lane.2 Courts promptly dismiss cases that fall within the parameters of the

† Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Many thanks to the participants in the Second
Trademark Scholars’ Roundtable at DePaul University College of Law in April 2010, and particularly to organizers Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, for a remarkably stimulating conference. I received valuable research
assistance on this comment from Mikka Gee Conway.
1. Rebecca Tushnet, Second Trademark Scholars Roundtable, Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)Log (April 16, 2010,
30 KWWSWXVKQHWEORJVSRWFRPVHFRQGWUDGHPDUNVFKRODUVURXQGWDEOHKWPO FRQWDLQLQJWKHÀUVW
of three detailed posts on the Roundtable).
2. Of course, some commentators argue that § 230 immunity is too generous, for normative reasons. See, e.g.,
Ann Bartow, ,QWHUQHW'HIDPDWLRQDV3URÀW&HQWHU7KH0RQHWL]DWLRQRI2QOLQH+DUDVVPHQW, 32 Harv. J. L. &
Gender 383, 417–19 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, &\EHU&LYLO5LJKWV, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 116–17 & n.377
(2009). That is not my concern here; whatever one’s views on the merits of the protection conferred by § 230, as
a procedural matter it functions as a fast lane.
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§ 230 exemption, often on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.3 A fast lane for trademark law would allow
similarly swift disposition of certain cases.
Building on Goldman’s analogy, I think there are two salient features of the supermarket
H[SUHVVODQHWKDWDOVRKROGWUXHIRUWUDGHPDUNGRFWULQH)LUVWWKHGHÀQLWLRQRIHOLJLELOLW\IRU
the fast lane must be quite clear. “Ten or fewer items” is a bright-line rule.4 Like any rule,
WKHUHZLOOEHGLIÀFXOWFDVHV2QHFDQLPDJLQHDGLVDJUHHPHQWRYHUZKHWKHUDEDJRIDSSOHV
counts as one item or several. Even then, a simple heuristic can resolve most such disputes:
SHUKDSV DQ LWHP FRXOG EH GHÀQHG DV HDFK XQLW WKH FDVKLHU PXVW VFDQ VHSDUDWHO\ :LWKRXW
VXFKVLPSOLFLW\WKHHIÀFLHQF\RIDIDVWODQHLVORVWLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKREHORQJVWKHUH $V
Goldman noted at the Roundtable, despite the poor drafting of § 230, courts developed a
fairly sharp-edged understanding of its boundaries.) I think of this as an “if/then” statement,
where both the “if” and the “then” must be clear. If you purchase 10 or fewer items, WKHQ you
may check out in this lane. If\RXRIIHUDGHÀQHG´LQWHUDFWLYHFRPSXWHUVHUYLFHµ5 WKHQ you
will not be liable for statements made through that service by others6 (except under certain
GHÀQHG W\SHV RI FODLPV QDPHO\ FULPLQDO ODZ LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\ ODZ RU WKH (OHFWURQLF
Communications Privacy Act7). For a trademark fast lane to function properly, it must have
similarly clear criteria, both for eligibility and for the resulting outcome.
Second, many shoppers use the slow lanes instead of the fast one. They wish to buy
more than 10 items and they accept the longer wait as a consequence. The supermarket
manager needs these other lanes to move expeditiously too, and may institute various reforms to speed them up (perhaps new cash registers or better training for workers). If the
PDQDJHUFRQFHQWUDWHVRQO\RQLPSURYLQJWKHHIÀFLHQF\RIWKHIDVWODQHRWKHUFXVWRPHUVDUH
condemned to grocery-store purgatory and may shop elsewhere, or purchase fewer items to
speed their checkout. And if everyone starts crowding into the fast lane to escape, it will
not remain fast. Some suggestions for reform of trademark law may suffer from a desire to
À[HYHU\SUREOHPZLWKMXVWRQHWRRO&RPSUHKHQVLYHUHIRUPUHTXLUHVQRWRQO\GHYHORSPHQW
RIDIDVWODQHEXWDOVRDWWHQWLRQWRWKHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVDQGLQHTXDOLWLHVLQDOOWKHRWKHUODQHV
These are distinct problems with largely distinct solutions. By combining different mechanisms, however, we can divide cases into different groups and apply different approaches
to each one.

3. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735
(RMB), 2009 WL 1704355 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (E.D. Va. 2008); DiMeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998).
4. This is so even when it is expressed ungrammatically as “10 items or less.”
5. See86& I  IRUDGHÀQLWLRQ&RXUWVKDYHVLQFHGHYHORSHGWKLVGHÀQLWLRQVRWKDWLWFDQEHDSplied unambiguously in almost all cases, as the cases cited in note 3 demonstrate.
6. Id. § 230(c).
7. Id. § 230(e).
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Earlier in the Roundtable, I offered another (and probably less effective) analogy, comparing this task to service on a law school admissions committee. The committee divides
DSSOLFDQWVLQWRWKUHHSLOHVDGPLWUHMHFWDQGFRQVLGHU2EYLRXVO\TXDOLÀHGDQGREYLRXVO\
XQTXDOLÀHGVWXGHQWVERWKSUHVHQWHDV\FDVHVWKDWUHTXLUHOLWWOHDWWHQWLRQIUHHLQJXSWKHFRPmittee’s time for more careful consideration of the borderline candidates placed in the middle
pile. This “three piles” analogy does add one useful complication to the “fast lane” analogy,
because it emphasizes that heuristics can speed consideration of cases in both directions—
with shortcuts on one side favoring the markholder and on the other side favoring the alleged
infringer. Cases in the middle take longer (but hopefully not too long) because we do not use
shortcuts favoring either side.8 This analogy also underscores two conditions under which
WKHV\VWHPGRHVQRWZRUNLILWLVWRRGLIÀFXOWWRGHFLGHLQZKLFKSLOHWRSXWDQDSSOLFDWLRQRU
if consideration of the middle pile is excessively burdensome.
Several Roundtable participants, in their own ways, propose comparable sorting of trademark cases. For instance, a number of participants are drawn to the idea of a “materiality”
requirement for some trademark cases. Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna recently argued
for “anchor[ing] once again to the core case of confusion regarding the actual source of a
defendant’s product or service, the type of confusion most obviously related to consumer
decision making.”9 In those traditional cases (along with ones where consumers believe the
markholder guarantees the quality of a defendant’s goods and services), they say, courts
should continue to presume materiality without requiring proof from a markholder. In a
wide range of other cases, however, markholders would need to demonstrate that the alleged consumer confusion is likely to affect consumers’ purchasing decisions.10 These cases
would proceed in a manner more akin to false advertising law, where materiality is an element that the plaintiff must prove to prevail. Even in these nontraditional cases, however,
courts might sometimes relieve markholders of the duty to prove harm. As Tushnet, another
materiality proponent, points out in her forthcoming work, false advertising doctrines have
developed over time which presume materiality in certain kinds of cases, such as those involving outright falsity or bad intent.11 Even though proposals like Lemley and McKenna’s
and Tushnet’s would demand proof of materiality in many more trademark infringement

2QHIXUWKHUUHÀQHPHQWWKDWGRHVQRWQHHGWRFOXWWHUWKHWH[WEXWVKRXOGEHQRWHGUHDOOLWLJDWLRQLQYROYHVPXOtiple issues, and we really sort cases one issue at a time. So, suppose a case presents a knotty issue over whether
a mark is generic, but the alleged infringer has used an identical mark on identical goods. The case would be
routed to the middle pile for genericism, but then might move faster to resolve the subsequent cut-and-dried
issues. Once the mark is valid, there is no need for a dozen Methodist bishops to testify individually that they
were confused by an identical usage.
9. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, ,UUHOHYDQW&RQIXVLRQ, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 414–15 (2010).
10. Id. at 450–52.
11. See Rebecca Tushnet, 5XQQLQJWKH*DPXW)URP$WR%)HGHUDO7UDGHPDUNDQG)DOVH$GYHUWLVLQJ/DZ,
159 Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010); VHHDOVR Lemley & McKenna, VXSUDQRWHDW PHQWLRQLQJEULHÁ\WKH
same possibility of presumptions).
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cases than under present doctrine, they still would relieve markholders of this duty in certain
FDWHJRULFDOO\GHÀQHGVLWXDWLRQV
Like materiality, other reform proposals also engage in this sorting exercise. Margreth
Barrett suggested after the Roundtable that four categories of trademark claims could be
reframed as “associational marketing” claims under § 43(a), requiring a broader and more
context-sensitive analysis.12 Proponents of a robust “trademark use” requirement likewise
have said that it could serve a “gatekeeper” function, shunting some cases onto a different
(and faster) track.13$QG,KDYHDUJXHGIRUGHÀQHGFDWHJRULFDOH[HPSWLRQVIURPOLDELOLW\IRU
certain unlicensed uses of trademarks.14
$OOWKHVHPRGHOVGHÀQHFHUWDLQFDWHJRULHVIRUVSHFLDOL]HGWUHDWPHQW%XWIHZDFWXDOO\FUHDWH
any fast lanes. A number of them, on closer examination, would improve the functioning of the
other lanes instead. Or, returning to the image of the three piles, many of these proposals would
move cases from the markholder-friendly pile to the middle pile, where they would receive
more searching analysis. Requiring proof of materiality, for instance, adds additional empirical
issues that must be resolved. In general, cases where materiality must be proven will require
more time and more resources for adjudication, because another complex and fact-intensive
question has been added to the mix.15 If false advertising is the model, materiality inquiries
may require competing consumer surveys and a battle of expert witnesses. While the shift to a
PDWHULDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWEHQHÀWVDOOHJHGLQIULQJHUVLWGRHVQRWGRVRSULPDULO\E\PDNLQJFDVHV
more predictable, easier, or cheaper to adjudicate. Rather, it increases careful analysis and judicial involvement in some cases where we now assume facts that point toward infringement.
So, the proposals are similar in their reliance on categorizing and rerouting certain classes
of cases for different treatment. But they differ, crucially, in the amount of friction they create in individual cases. While using many of the same civil procedure mechanisms named at

12. Margreth Barrett, $&DXVHRI$FWLRQIRU´3DVVLQJ2II$VVRFLDWLRQDO0DUNHWLQJ,” 1 IP Theory 1, 13–15
(2010) [manuscript at 13-15].
13. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, 7UDGHPDUNVDQG&RQVXPHU6HDUFK&RVWVRQWKH,QWHUQHW, 41 Hous.
L. Rev. 777, 805 (2004); Uli Widmaier, 8VH/LDELOLW\DQGWKH6WUXFWXUHRI7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 33 Hofstra L. Rev.
603, 621–24 (2004). As several of us have argued elsewhere, the trademark use requirement may not function as
a good fast lane because it does not have clear enough eligibility criteria. Instead of a bright-line rule (10 items
RUIHZHU GHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDXVHTXDOLÀHVDVQRQWUDGHPDUNXVHRIWHQLPSOLFDWHVPDQ\RIWKHVDPHIDFW
intensive inquiries explored under the likelihood of confusion test, which are just the ones we are trying to avoid.
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, &RQIXVLRQ2YHU8VH&RQWH[WXDOLVPLQ7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 92 Iowa
L. Rev. 1597, 1645 (2007); William McGeveran, 5HWKLQNLQJ7UDGHPDUN)DLU8VH, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 49, 79-80
(2008); Mark P. McKenna, 7UDGHPDUN8VHDQGWKH3UREOHPRI6RXUFH, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 773, 821-24 (2009).
14. See William McGeveran, 7KH7UDGHPDUN)DLU8VH5HIRUP$FW, 90 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
15. Several of us raised this concern at the Roundtable, and Barrett laid it out in her essay afterwards. See Barrett, VXSUD note 12, at 19–20.
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the outset—presumptions, defenses, and burdens—the various proposals assemble these into
quite different combinations. I certainly do not advocate choosing between reforms; most of
these ideas complement one another. Talking about the same mechanisms in different ways,
however, can cause confusion. I want to touch on each of these concepts as they relate to the
Roundtable topic: analyzing defensive doctrines in trademark law.
Presumptions infuse all of these proposals. At their simplest, presumptions are shortcuts
that replace particularized factual analysis with general situation-based rules. Lawyers use the
word in so many contexts, however, that it can become misleading. (Rebuttable, irrebuttable,
and bursting-bubble presumptions share the name but function quite differently.) The relevant
point for our Roundtable discussion is simpler: as Bone has explained, trademark law already
employs many presumptions, which represent classic tradeoffs between administrative costs
and error costs.16 These presumptions reduce administrative costs, but may reduce accuracy
as well. Sometimes they effectively determine ultimate liability, but often they resolve only
preliminary or intermediate issues. If we are sorting properly, we will devote the most deciVLRQPDNLQJ UHVRXUFHV WR GLIÀFXOW TXHVWLRQV WKDW GHVHUYH VXFK DWWHQWLRQ ,Q HDVLHU FDVHV WKH
administrative costs are not worth any marginally increased accuracy. Instead, we can rely on
SUHVXPSWLRQVIDYRULQJWKHVLGHWKDWDFRXUWSUREDEO\ WKRXJKSHUKDSVQRWGHÀQLWHO\ ZRXOG
favor on that point if it examined the question more closely. In other words, we will use presumptions in the two side piles but not in the middle pile.
Lemley, McKenna, and Tushnet want to discard an existing presumption (materiality) in
VRPH GHÀQHG FDVHV DQG PRYH WKRVH FDVHV IURP WKH PDUNKROGHUIULHQGO\ SLOH WR WKH PLGGOH
pile. Generally speaking, this will increase administrative costs for those cases, but should
also increase precision in results. That greater precision favors unlicensed users. However, in
real-world disputes between heavily invested markholders and unlicensed users, administrative
costs almost always disadvantage the latter. Even where trademark law clearly allows a use, the
mere threat of lengthy, complex, and expensive litigation scares unlicensed users. This is how
cease and desist letters achieve their in terrorem power. My project complements theirs, by creating cost-reducing presumptions immediately, moving some cases directly into the pile where
presumptions favor the user. In those cases, we would accept less precision to create a fast lane.
Not only are the two reforms consistent, the one can lead to the other. After taking away the
presumption of materiality, other presumptions might develop. Some of these new ones probably would favor the alleged infringer. For example, courts applying a materiality requirement to the middle pile may observe over time that markholders can never prove material
KDUPIURPÁHHWLQJJOLPSVHVRIDEUDQGQDPHLQDPRYLHRUWHOHYLVLRQSURJUDP17 They might
16. See Robert G. Bone, (QIRUFHPHQW&RVWVDQG7UDGHPDUN3X]]OHV, 90 Va. L. Rev. 2099, 2123–2124 (2004).
17. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Wham-O, Inc v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d. 1254 (N.D. Cal. 2003); VHHDOVR Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9, at
416–22 (suggesting other examples).
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then begin to impose a presumption against materiality in such cases. This eventually could
become robust enough to establish something approaching a categorical liability exemption
IRUÀOPPDNHUVXVLQJEUDQGQDPHV7KDWLVWKHW\SHRIIDLUXVHSUHVXPSWLRQ,KDYHDGYRFDWHG
and a materiality requirement might be one route to get there (after a lot of cases wound
their way through the judiciary). Barrett makes the same point in her new essay, arguing
that certain “limitations and defenses” could be applied to the middle-pile cases she groups
together as associational marketing, effectively moving them not only to the middle pile but
to the pile on the other end of the table.18,QWKLVZD\DGHÀQHGVXEVHWRIFDVHVHYHQWXDOO\
could become entitled to use a fast lane. That said, the primary doctrinal innovation in these
proposals is not to create new shortcuts that favor the users of marks, it is to eliminate old
shortcuts that favor markholders. They would increase, not reduce, administrative costs for
the foreseeable future. A reform agenda that did not address those costs in some other way
would be incomplete.
Defenses were, loosely speaking, the topic of the Roundtable. More precisely, however,
we convened to discuss defensive doctrines, which might include mechanisms other than
IRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHV19 Graeme Dinwoodie recently expanded on this broader understanding of trademark “defenses.”20+HGHÀQHGWKHPDV´UXOHVSHUPLWWLQJXQDXWKRUL]HGXVHV
RIPDUNVHYHQZKHUHVXFKXVHVLPSOLFDWHWKHDIÀUPDWLYHFRQFHUQVRIWUDGHPDUNODZµ21 At the
5RXQGWDEOHRXUODQJXDJHZDVQRWDOZD\VDVFDUHIXO$WÀUVWIRUH[DPSOHVRPHFRPPHQWV
(including mine) distinguished “internal” requirements from “external” ones—meaning that
the former were integrated in the prima facie infringement case while the latter were not.
This distinction, while perhaps useful in some contexts, was not necessarily relevant to the
FUHDWLRQRIIDVWODQHV2EYLRXVO\IRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHVDUHQRWDGHIHQGDQW·VRQO\SDWK
to victory, and they need not be the only route for a fast lane. As the Supreme Court summed
up a defendant’s varied options in .33HUPDQHQW0DNH8S,QFY/DVWLQJ,PSUHVVLRQ,,QF:
If a plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case of trademark infringement, including the element of likelihood of consumer confusion, the defendant may offer rebutting
evidence to undercut the force of the plaintiff’s evidence on this (or any) element, or raise
DQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHWREDUUHOLHIHYHQLIWKHSULPDIDFLHFDVHLVVRXQGRUGRERWK22
If the defendant can use any of these means to prevail quickly and simply, then broadly they
can be called defensive doctrines and they can serve as fast lanes.
18. See Barrett, VXSUD note 12, at 18–23.
)RUDQH[HPSODU\OLVWRIORQJHVWDEOLVKHGDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHVVHHFed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (listing, inter alia,
laches, res judicata, and statute of limitations defenses).
20. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, /HZLV &ODUN/DZ6FKRRO1LQWK'LVWLQJXLVKHG,3/HFWXUH'HYHORSLQJ'HIHQVHVLQ7UDGHPDUN/DZ, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 99, 144–152 (2009).
21. Id. at 100.
22. 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004).
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0RGHUQFRXUWVSD\UHODWLYHO\OLWWOHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYH
defenses and other defensive doctrines. The )HGHUDO 5XOHV RI &LYLO 3URFHGXUH specify that
courts generally should disregard a defendant’s failure to label defenses properly in a responsive pleading.23 Whether one calls a particular doctrine a “defense” (or “external” to the prima
IDFLHFDVH PD\QRWPDWWHUYHU\PXFK7KHWHUPFDQUHIHUWRDIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHEXW
also for our purposes to any doctrine that allows the defendant to prevail notwithstanding the
existence of some key indicia of liability. And the most common usage of the word is the least
precise of all: a simple denial of the plaintiff’s accusation (“I didn’t do it”) is a “defense” too,
though it speaks only to the prima facie case. If bolstered by presumptions, such denials can
function as fast lanes.
$WWLPHVLWFDQEHGLIÀFXOWHYHQWRFODVVLI\DGHIHQVLYHGRFWULQHDVLQWHUQDORUH[WHUQDOLQWKH
sense used at the Roundtable. Although the statutory language of § 230 is expressed as an exFOXVLRQIURPSRWHQWLDOOLDELOLW\UDWKHUWKDQLQWKHIRUPRIDQLQGHSHQGHQWDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
there has been some judicial confusion about its precise status.24 Whether or not it is part of
WKHSULPDIDFLHFDVHRUDIRUPDOGHIHQVHDQDUJXPHQWWKDWDOLWLJDQWTXDOLÀHVIRULPmunity should be seen as a GHIHQVLYHGRFWULQH. Defendants can (and do) invoke this argument
early in litigation, destroying the case against them. This is a fast lane. The same ambiguity
also can be seen in the evolution of defamation law. Traditionally, proving the truth of an alOHJHGO\GHIDPDWRU\VWDWHPHQWJDYHULVHWRDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHWRGHIDPDWLRQOLDELOLW\7KH
falsity of the statement later evolved into a required element of the prima facie case in the
large majority of states. In the actual functioning of litigation, however, little changed. Courts
still refer to truth informally as a “defense,” epitomized by one 2009 state appellate decision
which declared, “Because falsity is an essential element of both libel and slander, truth is a
perfect defense to a defamation action.”25 The ambiguity (and perhaps even irrelevance) of the
formal status of truth as an element or a defense—as “internal” or “external”—demonstrates
that this is not the crucial question. Of course, truth is such a fact-intensive issue in defamation cases that it rarely allows for fast-lane disposition, regardless of whether it is an element
RUDGHIHQVH+HUHDVXVXDOWKHGHIHQVLYHGRFWULQH·VFRPSOH[LW\PDWWHUVPRUHWKDQLWVRIÀFLDO
status under civil procedure.
Burdens, as Bone pointed out in his Roundtable remarks, are fundamental to the design
of these decisionmaking structures. Here again, though, we should introduce greater precision. First, in our discussion we often spoke of burdens without specifying their exact
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(2), 8(e).
24. See Eric Goldman, 1LQWK&LUFXLW+HOSIXOO\$PHQGVBarnes v. Yahoo2SLQLRQ, Tech. & Marketing Law
Blog (June 22, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/ninth_circuit_h.htm (discussing amendment of opinion in Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) that eliminated characterization of § 230
LPPXQLW\DVDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH 
25. Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 682 S.E.2d 346, 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); VHHDOVRHJ., Ladd v.
Uecker, 780 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
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nature. There are many kinds of burdens, including burdens of pleading, production, and
persuasion. In the normal civil case, all these burdens are assigned to the plaintiff, who must
plead the necessary elements of the prima facie case, produce evidence in support of those
HOHPHQWVDQGSHUVXDGHDÀQGHURIIDFWWKDWDSUHSRQGHUDQFHRIWKHHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVWKH
defendant’s liability. Courts depart from this default rule in special situations, most famously
in employment discrimination,26 but also in circumstances such as the application of res ipsa
loquitur.27
More important, participants often took it for granted that all burdens are—well, burdensome. In practice, this is not always so. As noted above, burdens of pleading are seldom
dispositive in modern litigation.28%XUGHQVRISURGXFWLRQFDQLPSRVHGLIÀFXOWLHVLIHYLGHQFH
LVHVSHFLDOO\GLIÀFXOWWRSURFXUHEXWJHQHUDOO\WKH\MXVWDVVLJQWKHSDUW\ZKRPXVWPDNHWKH
ÀUVWPRYHWREDFNXSDFODLP%XUGHQVRISHUVXDVLRQ³SURRI³KDYHWKHPRVWELWH(YHQKHUH
however, the allocation of the burden matters only in close cases. When the body of evidence
SRLQWVVLJQLÀFDQWO\RQHZD\RUWKHRWKHUWKDWVLGHSUHYDLOVQRPDWWHUZKLFKRQHFDUULHVWKH
burden. In other words, burdens of persuasion serve as tiebreakers. If a case is not already in
equipoise, they do not have much weight. The cases where burdens of persuasion matter are
precisely the close ones that belong in the middle pile. By contrast, the cases eligible for the
fast lane should be those where the outcome was fairly predictable from the beginning, far
from equipoise. Applying presumptions to those cases, as discussed above, further lightens
any burden of persuasion.
)RUPDO burdens of pleading, persuasion, and proof do not necessarily align with DFWXDO
EXUGHQVRIFRVWGLIÀFXOW\RUSRVVLEOHGHIHDW$WWLPHVGLVFXVVLRQDWWKH5RXQGWDEOHIRFXVHG
RQUHOLHYLQJIDLUXVHV RURWKHUEHQHÀFLDOWKLUGSDUW\XVHVRIDPDUN IURPIRUPDOEXUGHQV
rather than from actual ones. The plaintiff carries all the formal burdens to demonstrate likelihood of confusion, but no sensible defendant sits idly on the sidelines hoping to win by the
weakness of the plaintiff’s evidence. Defendants naturally must hire their own experts, commission their own surveys, and brief their own interpretation of the convoluted multifactor

26. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (discussing burden-shifting structure
of federal employment discrimination litigation); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
(same).
27. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1965) (explaining allocation of burdens in situations where
a harm is the sort normally presumed to derive from negligence).
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VUHFHQWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVLQSOHDGLQJVWDQGDUGVDQGLQWURGXFWLRQRI´SODXVLELOLW\µUHquirements may make burdens of pleading more important for plaintiffs. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937
(2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); VHHDOVR Rebecca Tushnet, 8QIDLU&RPSHWLWLRQ
DQG8QFRPPRQ6HQVH, 95 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 17, 18-20 (2009), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_
Tushnet.pdf (analyzing possible impact of 7ZRPEO\ and ,TEDO in trademark litigation). It is not yet clear how
these developments will affect defendants as opposed to plaintiffs. Moreover, as noted below, in straightforward
cases it should be easy to plead the existence of fair use, even under the newer standard.
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test.29 In reality, they escape only the feather-light pleading burden on the confusion point
(and many defendants choose to insert boilerplate denials of confusion in their answers anyway). They still carry actual burdens of production and persuasion. The same would be true
of any element of the prima facie case placing a burden on the plaintiff to produce evidence
that proves a complex factual claim—it imposes an actual, if not a formal, burden on the
defendant as well. Demanding that the plaintiff prove materiality, for example, necessarily
demands that the defendant rebut that proof, probably with its own evidence. I do nott mean
to say that formal burdens are unimportant, only that they tell just part of the story.
Some court decisions contribute to a misguided focus on formal rather than actual burdens.
KP Permanent has been read, appropriately, as a case about allocating burdens of proof, but
some observers forget that the Court there analyzed those burdens as a means of statutory
FRQVWUXFWLRQ WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVHRIGHVFULSWLYHXVHXQGHU E
(4) was vitiated by the existence of a likelihood of confusion).30 The main thrust of the decision was to interpret the text, not to rescue defendants from formal burdens.31 In &HQWXU\
5HDO(VWDWH&RUSY/HQGLQJWUHH,QF., the Third Circuit overreacted to KP Permanent when
LWVWULFWO\FRQÀQHGWKHQRPLQDWLYHXVHGRFWULQHWRDUROHDVDQDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH32 This rigid
structure may have distributed formal burdens fairly, but in reality it limited the defendant’s
options and increased actual burdens. A defendant with a strong nominative use claim would
EHIRUFHGQRQHWKHOHVVWRUHIXWHHYLGHQFHRIFRQIXVLRQXQGHUWKHPXOWLIDFWRUWHVWÀUVWEHIRUH
any consideration of the defense. Judge Kozinski (the original creator of the nominative use
test) presented a much more sensible structure for burdens in nominative use in a very recent
Ninth Circuit decision, 7R\RWD0RWRU6DOHV86$,QFY7DEDUL.33 In 7DEDUL, the Ninth Circuit maintained its precedent that makes nominative use a substitute confusion test (that is, a
defensive doctrine but not a true formal defense). As to burdens, the court held:

29. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008); McGeveran, VXSUD note 13,
at 70–71 (discussing the length and cost of :DO0DUW litigation).
30. The Court wisely concluded that the design of the statute contemplated a distinct inquiry into descriptiveness, however the confusion inquiry came out. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. 543
86   ´>,@WZRXOGPDNHQRVHQVHWRJLYHWKHGHIHQGDQWDGHIHQVHRIVKRZLQJDIÀUPDWLYHO\WKDW
the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some element (like confusion); all the defendant needs to do is to leave
WKHIDFWÀQGHUXQSHUVXDGHGWKDWWKHSODLQWLIIKDVFDUULHGLWVRZQEXUGHQRQWKDWSRLQWµ $VQRWHGDERYHKRZHYHUWKH&RXUWDOVRHPSKDVL]HGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWKDVPXOWLSOHRSWLRQVIRUSUHYDLOLQJDQGWKHDIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
under § 33(b)(4) is only one of them. 6HHVXSUD note 22 and accompanying text.
31. Of course, the Ninth Circuit’s previous practice of requiring defendants to disprove likelihood of confusion
GLGLQFUHDVHWKHLUDFWXDOEXUGHQVVLJQLÀFDQWO\<HWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·VGHFLVLRQFKDQJHGWKHVLWXDWLRQOHVVWKDQ
PLJKWKDYHEHHQH[SHFWHGEHFDXVHGHIHQGDQWVFRQWLQXHWRIDFHDVLJQLÀFDQWDFWXDOEXUGHQ³DVVKRZQE\WKH
Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d
596, 607–09 (9th Cir. 2005).
32. 425 F.3d 211 (3d. Cir. 2005).
33. 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a defense need only show that it used
the mark to refer to the trademarked good, as the Tabaris undoubtedly have here. The burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion.34
The defendant must raise the issue (essentially a burden of pleading), but then the formal
burdens shift. More importantly, Judge Kozinski’s structure spares the defendant the actual
EXUGHQRIPRXQWLQJDIXOOFRQIXVLRQGHIHQVH&HUWDLQO\WKLVTXDOLÀHVDVDIDVWODQH
In sum, effective reform of defensive doctrines in trademark law will require precise
thinking about the related concepts of presumptions, defenses, and burdens. That reform
VKRXOGLQFOXGHIDVWODQHV,QP\YLHZVRPHLGHQWLÀDEOHFDWHJRULHVRIHDV\FDVHVVKRXOGZKL]
through the courthouse at top speed. Uses in those categories ought to enjoy a presumption
against liability. Where such presumptions arise, we could say that a “defense” exists, though
LWQHHGQRWVKDUHDOOWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDIRUPDODIÀUPDWLYHGHIHQVH7KHUHVXOWLQJGRFWULnal structure may assign formal burdens in a variety of ways, but it creates effective fast lanes
only if actual burdens on the defendant remain minimal.35
For the cases that do not qualify for a fast lane, we will have to turn to other approaches.
Some of these other reforms might be called “defenses” too, and they may use presumptions
and burdens as tools. Where they increase actual burdens, however, these other ideas do not
create fast lanes. The resulting administrative costs created by these reforms will make some
fair uses legal in theory but hazardous in reality. That may be unavoidable for complex disputes that require fact-intensive analysis, but trademark fair use ought to strive for fast-lane
treatment in categories where the damage to free speech predictably outweighs the threat to
trademarks’ economic functions.
Dialogue at the Roundtable helped force these important issues of procedural design, and
their accompanying normative consequences, to the surface. As we continue to debate the
best ways to improve trademark law, and particularly its defensive doctrines, I know I will
pay greater attention to the complexity of presumptions, defenses, and burdens.

34. Id. at 1183.
35. I describe these ideas in detail in a forthcoming article. See McGeveran, VXSUD note 14.
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